Testable implications of the core in TU market games

Yasushi Agatsuma*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)


    This paper clarifies testable implications of the core on allocation data in cooperative market games with transferable utility (TU market games). By employing the revealed preference approach, we provide a finite system of inequalities whose solvability is equivalent to an allocation data set to be consistent with the core of some TU market game. If initial endowment vectors are not observed, it turns out that the core rationalizability is equivalent to the Pareto rationalizability, that is, the core and Pareto optimality are observationally equivalent in TU market games.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)23-29
    Number of pages7
    JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
    Publication statusPublished - 2016 May 1


    • Core rationalization
    • Market games
    • Pareto rationalization
    • Revealed preference
    • Testable implications

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Applied Mathematics


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