TY - JOUR
T1 - The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions
T2 - From finite to continuum economies
AU - Kaneko, Mamoru
AU - Wooders, Myrna Holtz
PY - 1989
Y1 - 1989
N2 - When permissible coalitions in finite economies are constrained to be small relative to the player set, the continuum model with finite coalitions and its f-core are the limits of large finite economies and their ε-cores. We show convergence both of game-theoretic structures-relatively small coalitions in the finite economies converge to finite coalitions-and of solutions-ε-cores converge to the f-core. Our convergence is carried out in the context of exchange economies with widespread externalities where the requirement that coalitions be small is critical.
AB - When permissible coalitions in finite economies are constrained to be small relative to the player set, the continuum model with finite coalitions and its f-core are the limits of large finite economies and their ε-cores. We show convergence both of game-theoretic structures-relatively small coalitions in the finite economies converge to finite coalitions-and of solutions-ε-cores converge to the f-core. Our convergence is carried out in the context of exchange economies with widespread externalities where the requirement that coalitions be small is critical.
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U2 - 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90071-9
DO - 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90071-9
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:38249026377
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 49
SP - 135
EP - 168
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -