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The projective core of symmetric games with externalities
Takaaki Abe
*
,
Yukihiko Funaki
*
Corresponding author for this work
School of Political Science and Economics
Research output
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peer-review
2
Citations (Scopus)
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Keyphrases
Economic Model
100%
Coalition Structure
100%
Partition Function
100%
Games with Externalities
100%
Symmetric Games
100%
Public Goods Game
50%
Grand Coalition
50%
Stability Concepts
50%
Small Perturbation
50%
Common Pool Resource Game
50%
Common Property
50%
Bertrand Competition
50%
Cournot Competition
50%
Partition Function Games
50%
Stable Distribution
50%
Symmetric Partition
50%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Public Goods
100%
Common Pool Resources
100%
Externalities
100%
Cournot Competition
100%
Bertrand Competition
100%