The unbinding core for coalitional form games

Takaaki Abe*, Yukihiko Funaki

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In this paper, we introduce a new core concept called the unbinding core by extending the definition of a deviation. In the traditional definition, players deviate if a profitable allocation exists after their deviation, while our new definition requires that all possible allocations are profitable. Therefore, the unbinding core becomes a superset of the traditional core. We examine some properties of the unbinding core. A sufficient condition for the unbinding core to be nonempty is also provided.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)39-42
Number of pages4
JournalMathematical social sciences
Publication statusPublished - 2021 Sept


  • Cooperative game
  • Core
  • Deviation
  • Uncertainty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Psychology(all)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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