TY - JOUR
T1 - The unbinding core for coalitional form games
AU - Abe, Takaaki
AU - Funaki, Yukihiko
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees and associate editor for their helpful feedback. In particular, the improvement of Proposition 4.2 is attributed to the valuable comments provided by the referees. The authors also appreciate the constructive comments provided by Youngsub Chun, Stéphane Gonzalez, Toru Hokari, Fuhito Kojima and Peter Sudhölter. This work is supported by JSPS, Japan Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up (No. 19K23206 ), JSPS KAKENHI, Japan No. 17H02503 and Waseda Univeristy Grant-in-Aid for Research Base Creation, Japan ( 2019C-486 ).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2021/9
Y1 - 2021/9
N2 - In this paper, we introduce a new core concept called the unbinding core by extending the definition of a deviation. In the traditional definition, players deviate if a profitable allocation exists after their deviation, while our new definition requires that all possible allocations are profitable. Therefore, the unbinding core becomes a superset of the traditional core. We examine some properties of the unbinding core. A sufficient condition for the unbinding core to be nonempty is also provided.
AB - In this paper, we introduce a new core concept called the unbinding core by extending the definition of a deviation. In the traditional definition, players deviate if a profitable allocation exists after their deviation, while our new definition requires that all possible allocations are profitable. Therefore, the unbinding core becomes a superset of the traditional core. We examine some properties of the unbinding core. A sufficient condition for the unbinding core to be nonempty is also provided.
KW - Cooperative game
KW - Core
KW - Deviation
KW - Uncertainty
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U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.04.007
DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.04.007
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85105359154
SN - 0165-4896
VL - 113
SP - 39
EP - 42
JO - Mathematical social sciences
JF - Mathematical social sciences
ER -