TY - JOUR
T1 - The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values
AU - Abe, Takaaki
AU - Nakada, Satoshi
N1 - Funding Information:
This paper was previously circulated as “Priority-regarding Shapley values”. The authors are grateful to an associate editor and anonymous referees for many helpful suggestions. We thank Yukihiko Funaki, Hideshi Itoh, Jingyi Xue, Shinsuke Kambe, Takashi Ui and Koji Yokote for constructive comments. We also thank seminar participants in the Contract Theory Workshop East and Graduate Summer Workshop on Game Theory 2016 at Soul National University. Abe and Nakada acknowledge financial support from the Japan Society for Promotion of Science (JSPS). All remaining errors are our own.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2019/2/14
Y1 - 2019/2/14
N2 - We propose a new class of allocation rules for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), weighted-egalitarian Shapley values, where each rule in this class takes into account each player’s contributions and heterogeneity among players to determine each player’s allocation. We provide an axiomatic foundation for the rules with a given weight profile (i.e., exogenous weights) and the class of rules (i.e., endogenous weights). The axiomatization results illustrate the differences among our class of rules, the Shapley value, the egalitarian Shapley values, and the weighted Shapley values.
AB - We propose a new class of allocation rules for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), weighted-egalitarian Shapley values, where each rule in this class takes into account each player’s contributions and heterogeneity among players to determine each player’s allocation. We provide an axiomatic foundation for the rules with a given weight profile (i.e., exogenous weights) and the class of rules (i.e., endogenous weights). The axiomatization results illustrate the differences among our class of rules, the Shapley value, the egalitarian Shapley values, and the weighted Shapley values.
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U2 - 10.1007/s00355-018-1143-3
DO - 10.1007/s00355-018-1143-3
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85050591440
SN - 0176-1714
VL - 52
SP - 197
EP - 213
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
IS - 2
ER -