Tolerance and herd behavior: Sophistication of ideas under payoff complementarity

Koki Oikawa*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In this paper, I first show that there may be inefficient herd behavior even with a continuous choice set and a continuous loss function if there is payoff complementarity. Then, I show that the probability of inefficient herd behavior is asymptotically zero and the choice sequence converges to the optimal one almost surely if people have even a small amount of tolerance that they are willing to accept one another as a partner in joint work. This result is closely related to the argument in J. S. Mill's On Liberty, where he states that tolerance for others' ideas is essential for sophistication of ideas.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)539-554
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2011 Aug 1
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Economics and Econometrics


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