Two-person ex post implementation

Yoshihiro Ohashi*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)


    This paper investigates the ex post implementation of a social choice set with two agents. A social choice set F is ex post implementable with two agents if F satisfies the conditions of ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity (EM) in an environment that is economic and has a bad outcome. Furthermore, if F is a social choice function, (EPIC), (EM), and an economic environment are sufficient.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)435-440
    Number of pages6
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Issue number1
    Publication statusPublished - 2012 May


    • Ex post equilibrium
    • Implementation
    • Two-person

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Finance


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