TY - JOUR
T1 - A coalition formation value for games in partition function form
AU - Grabisch, Michel
AU - Funaki, Yukihiko
PY - 2012/8/16
Y1 - 2012/8/16
N2 - The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, a central question is how to allocate the worth of the grand coalition to each player, i.e.; how to find an adequate solution concept, taking into account the whole process of coalition formation. We propose in this paper the original concepts of scenario-value, process-value and coalition formation value, which represent the average contribution of players in a scenario (a particular sequence of coalitions within a given coalition formation process), in a process (a sequence of partitions of the society), and in the whole (all processes being taken into account), respectively. We give also two axiomatizations of our coalition formation value.
AB - The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, a central question is how to allocate the worth of the grand coalition to each player, i.e.; how to find an adequate solution concept, taking into account the whole process of coalition formation. We propose in this paper the original concepts of scenario-value, process-value and coalition formation value, which represent the average contribution of players in a scenario (a particular sequence of coalitions within a given coalition formation process), in a process (a sequence of partitions of the society), and in the whole (all processes being taken into account), respectively. We give also two axiomatizations of our coalition formation value.
KW - Coalition formation
KW - Game theory
KW - Games in partition function form
KW - Shapley value
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U2 - 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.02.036
DO - 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.02.036
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84860235870
SN - 0377-2217
VL - 221
SP - 175
EP - 185
JO - European Journal of Operational Research
JF - European Journal of Operational Research
IS - 1
ER -