A linear proportional effort allocation rule

Yoshio Kamijo*


研究成果: Article査読

5 被引用数 (Scopus)


This paper proposes a new class of allocation rules in network games. Like the solution theory in cooperative games of how the Harsanyi dividend of each coalition is distributed among a set of players, this new class of allocation rules focuses on the distribution of the dividend of each network. The dividend of each network is allocated in proportion to some measure of each player's effort, which is called an effort function. With linearity of the allocation rules, an allocation rule is specified by the effort functions. These types of allocation rules are called linear proportional effort allocation rules. Two famous allocation rules, the Myerson value and the position value, belong to this class of allocation rules. In this study, we provide a unifying approach to define the two aforementioned values. Moreover, we provide an axiomatic analysis of this class of allocation rules, and axiomatize the Myerson value, the position value, and their non-symmetric generalizations in terms of effort functions. We propose a new allocation rule in network games that also belongs to this class of allocation rules.

ジャーナルMathematical social sciences
出版ステータスPublished - 2009 11月

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会学および政治科学
  • 社会科学(全般)
  • 心理学(全般)
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性


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