A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls

Yu Zhou

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.012

A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls

Yu Zhou

研究成果: Article › 査読

抄録

We extend the multi-item auction model of Talman and Yang (2008) and Andersson et al. (2015) by considering both unit-demand bidders with budget constraints and price controls on bidding items. Due to these budget and price restrictions, a Walrasian equilibrium generally fails to exist. To achieve efficiency, we propose a rationed equilibrium whose allocation is in the core. We also construct an ascending auction to find the proposed rationed equilibrium in (pseudo-)polynomial time.

本文言語	English
ページ（範囲）	76-79
ページ数	4
ジャーナル	Economics Letters
巻	155
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.012
出版ステータス	Published - 2017 6月 1
外部発表	はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

財務
経済学、計量経済学

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10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.012

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AB - We extend the multi-item auction model of Talman and Yang (2008) and Andersson et al. (2015) by considering both unit-demand bidders with budget constraints and price controls on bidding items. Due to these budget and price restrictions, a Walrasian equilibrium generally fails to exist. To achieve efficiency, we propose a rationed equilibrium whose allocation is in the core. We also construct an ascending auction to find the proposed rationed equilibrium in (pseudo-)polynomial time.

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KW - Price controls

KW - Rationed equilibrium

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A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls

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