TY - JOUR
T1 - A note on separability and intra-household resource allocation in a collective household model
AU - Fujii, Tomoki
AU - Ishikawa, Ryuichiro
PY - 2013/3
Y1 - 2013/3
N2 - This paper shows that it is possible to track the changes in the distribution of power within a couple by focusing on the changes in the pattern of private consumption when the consumption decisions are efficient and private consumption is separable from public consumption in individual preferences. We first show that the separability of private consumption from public consumption at the individual level carries over to the household level. Hence, changes in public consumption only matters through a change in the residual budget available for private consumption. When the consumption decisions within the household is efficient, private consumption decisions can be modeled as the solution of a problem consisting in maximizing a weighted sum of the private-consumption sub-utility functions of the spouses under the residual budget, the weights being unique and representing the distribution of power over the allocation of private consumption. The model presented in this paper can be used to analyze the changes in the household resource allocation due to, for example, childbirth.
AB - This paper shows that it is possible to track the changes in the distribution of power within a couple by focusing on the changes in the pattern of private consumption when the consumption decisions are efficient and private consumption is separable from public consumption in individual preferences. We first show that the separability of private consumption from public consumption at the individual level carries over to the household level. Hence, changes in public consumption only matters through a change in the residual budget available for private consumption. When the consumption decisions within the household is efficient, private consumption decisions can be modeled as the solution of a problem consisting in maximizing a weighted sum of the private-consumption sub-utility functions of the spouses under the residual budget, the weights being unique and representing the distribution of power over the allocation of private consumption. The model presented in this paper can be used to analyze the changes in the household resource allocation due to, for example, childbirth.
KW - Bargaining
KW - Collective model
KW - Intra-household resource allocation
KW - Separability
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84874188546&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1007/s11150-012-9155-8
DO - 10.1007/s11150-012-9155-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84874188546
SN - 1569-5239
VL - 11
SP - 143
EP - 149
JO - Review of Economics of the Household
JF - Review of Economics of the Household
IS - 1
ER -