抄録
A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class.
| 本文言語 | English |
|---|---|
| ページ（範囲） | 303-340 |
| ページ数 | 38 |
| ジャーナル | Theory and Decision |
| 巻 | 67 |
| 号 | 3 |
| DOI | |
| 出版ステータス | Published - 2009 9月 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- 決定科学一般
- 発達心理学および教育心理学
- 人文科学（その他）
- 経済学、計量経済学および金融学一般
- 応用心理学
- コンピュータ サイエンスの応用
- 社会科学一般