Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes

Ai Takeuchi, Róbert F. Veszteg*, Yoshio Kamijo, Yukihiko Funaki

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

Using experimental data, we show that the characteristics of the joint production process have a notable impact on the distribution of bargaining agreements. The setting in which the jointly produced surplus is expressed to be proportional to individual inputs leads to significantly more proportional bargaining agreements. This is in contrast to the setting in which the surplus is expressed as an additive constant, where bargaining agreements are more in line with the Nash bargaining solution.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)169-198
ページ数30
ジャーナルGames and Economic Behavior
134
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2022 7月

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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