Behavior strategies, mixed strategies and perfect recall

Mamoru Kaneko*, J. Jude Kline

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

20 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

When perfect recall is not satisfied, the informational contents of mixed and behavior strategies differ and are more than what the information partition describes. First, we consider two kinds of additional information strategies may carry, and show that such information leads to the perfect recall refinement of a given information partition. This does not, however, imply that the strategies compensate fully for the lack of perfect recall. We give a necessary and sufficient condition on an information partition, called A-loss, for the informational content of mixed strategies to fully compensate for the lack of perfect recall. The informational content of behavior strategies never fully compensates.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)127-145
ページ数19
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Game Theory
24
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 1995 6月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会科学(その他)
  • 統計学および確率
  • 数学(その他)
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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