TY - JOUR
T1 - Behavior strategies, mixed strategies and perfect recall
AU - Kaneko, Mamoru
AU - Kline, J. Jude
PY - 1995/6
Y1 - 1995/6
N2 - When perfect recall is not satisfied, the informational contents of mixed and behavior strategies differ and are more than what the information partition describes. First, we consider two kinds of additional information strategies may carry, and show that such information leads to the perfect recall refinement of a given information partition. This does not, however, imply that the strategies compensate fully for the lack of perfect recall. We give a necessary and sufficient condition on an information partition, called A-loss, for the informational content of mixed strategies to fully compensate for the lack of perfect recall. The informational content of behavior strategies never fully compensates.
AB - When perfect recall is not satisfied, the informational contents of mixed and behavior strategies differ and are more than what the information partition describes. First, we consider two kinds of additional information strategies may carry, and show that such information leads to the perfect recall refinement of a given information partition. This does not, however, imply that the strategies compensate fully for the lack of perfect recall. We give a necessary and sufficient condition on an information partition, called A-loss, for the informational content of mixed strategies to fully compensate for the lack of perfect recall. The informational content of behavior strategies never fully compensates.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=21844526471&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=21844526471&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/BF01240038
DO - 10.1007/BF01240038
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:21844526471
SN - 0020-7276
VL - 24
SP - 127
EP - 145
JO - International Journal of Game Theory
JF - International Journal of Game Theory
IS - 2
ER -