Competition through endogenized tournaments: An interpretation of "face-to-face" competition

Hideki Konishi, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Yutaka Suzuki

研究成果: Article査読

4 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper presents an alternative solution, called "face-to-face" competition, to the hold-up problem of relation-specific investments in the world of incomplete contracts. By inherent multiplicity of equilibria and incentive-compatible equilibrium selection, a tournament among multiple agents is endogenously created in the structure of face-to-face competition to strengthen their investment incentive. This approach also explains, by the reason other than bargaining power and insurance, why typical auto-assemblers in Japan do not vertically integrate a single parts supplier but transact with two potentially competitive suppliers in their developments of new models. J. Japan. Int. Econ., September 1996, 10(3), pp. 199-232. Faculty of Economics, Seikei University; Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo; and Faculty of Economics, Hosei University.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)199-232
ページ数34
ジャーナルJournal of The Japanese and International Economies
10
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 1996 9月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 政治学と国際関係論

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