Demonstration of power: Experimental results on bilateral bargaining

Noemí Navarro, Róbert F. Veszteg*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

3 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We test the empirical effectiveness of two theoretical proposals to equilibrate bargaining power in bilateral bargaining. Our experimental design is based on the two-player versions of the multibidding game (Pérez-Castrillo & Wettstein, 2001) and the bid-and-propose game (Navarro & Perea, 2005). Both models build on the ultimatum game and balance parties' bargaining power by auctioning the role of the proposer in the first stage. We find that proposers learn how to send an acceptable proposal by trial and error, guided by responders' rejections. The observed behavior stabilizes for the final experimental rounds and the payoff gap between the proposer and the responder seems to close down. However, the strategies chosen by subjects are remarkably different from the theoretical ones.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)762-772
ページ数11
ジャーナルJournal of Economic Psychology
32
5
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2011 10月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会学および政治科学
  • 応用心理学
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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