Dynastic politicians: Theory and evidence from Japan

Yasushi Asako*, Takeshi Iida, Tetsuya Matsubayashi, Michiko Ueda

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

44 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Dynastic politicians, defined as those whose family members have also served in the same position in the past, occupy a sizable portion of offices in many parts of the world. We develop a model of how dynastic politicians with inherited political advantages affect electoral outcomes and policy choices. Our model predicts that, as compared with non-dynastic legislators, dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district, enjoy higher electoral success, and harm the economic performance of the districts, despite the larger amount of distributive benefits they bring. We test the implications of the model using data from Japan between 1997 and 2007.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)5-32
ページ数28
ジャーナルJapanese Journal of Political Science
16
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2015 2月 10

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会学および政治科学
  • 政治学と国際関係論

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