TY - JOUR
T1 - Group size and group success in conflicts
AU - Kolmar, Martin
AU - Rommeswinkel, Hendrik
N1 - Funding Information:
Financial support by the Swiss National Science Foundation through grants P1SGP1_148727 and P2SGP1_155407 is gratefully acknowledged.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2020/12/1
Y1 - 2020/12/1
N2 - This paper analyzes the occurrence of the group-size paradox in situations in which groups compete for rents, allowing for degrees of rivalry of the rent among group members. We provide two intuitive criteria for the group-impact function which for groups with within-group symmetric valuations of the rent determine whether there are advantages or disadvantages for larger groups: social-interactions effects and returns to scale. For groups with within-group asymmetric valuations, the complementarity of group members’ efforts and the composition of valuations are shown to play a role as further factors.
AB - This paper analyzes the occurrence of the group-size paradox in situations in which groups compete for rents, allowing for degrees of rivalry of the rent among group members. We provide two intuitive criteria for the group-impact function which for groups with within-group symmetric valuations of the rent determine whether there are advantages or disadvantages for larger groups: social-interactions effects and returns to scale. For groups with within-group asymmetric valuations, the complementarity of group members’ efforts and the composition of valuations are shown to play a role as further factors.
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U2 - 10.1007/s00355-020-01264-0
DO - 10.1007/s00355-020-01264-0
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85086000491
SN - 0176-1714
VL - 55
SP - 777
EP - 822
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
IS - 4
ER -