Higher-Order Bayesian Statistical Decision Theory of Consciousness, Probabilistic Justification, and Predictive Processing

Jakob Hohwy has suggested that “the free energy principle may fit with a contemporary theory of consciousness, namely a Bayesian metacognitive theory recently proposed by Hakwan Lau”, according to which “perceptual consciousness depends on our Bayesian decisions, i.e., criterion setting, based on… higher-order representations [of the variance of probability density functions]”. Hohwy then goes into some details in making this connection, while setting aside “the higher-order thought theory with which it is initially presented and, instead, via the notion of active inference”. In this chapter, I shall not repeat Hohwy’s argumentation in his paper and will instead develop a possible direction that is more in line with Lau’s original settings. One crucial point to be noted is that the version of higher-order theory being explored here should not be understood as a higher-order thought theory; nor should it be understood as a higher-order perception theory. This will be clear only after the positive view is presented.