抄録
This paper investigates productivity improving merger activities between a public firm and a private firm in mixed oligopoly. We assume that the merged firm has two plants (formerly, firms). We show that both owners of a public firm and a private firm want to merge by coordinating their shareholding ratios in the merged firm, whenever the number of private firms is larger than a critical value, while the public firm does not want to merge without the effect of improving the productivity of the merged firm.
| 本文言語 | English |
|---|---|
| ジャーナル | Economics Bulletin |
| 巻 | 12 |
| 号 | 20 |
| 出版ステータス | Published - 2007 9月 11 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- 経済学、計量経済学および金融学（全般）