TY - GEN
T1 - Perfectly Secure Message Transmission Against Independent Rational Adversaries
AU - Yasunaga, Kenji
AU - Koshiba, Takeshi
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgments. This work was supported in part by JSPS Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Numbers 16H01705, 17H01695, 18K11159, and 19K22849.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - Secure Message Transmission (SMT) is a two-party protocol by which the sender can privately transmit a message to the receiver through multiple channels. An adversary can corrupt a subset of channels and makes eavesdropping and tampering over the corrupted channels. Fujita et al. (GameSec 2018) introduced a game-theoretic security notion of SMT, and showed protocols that are secure even if an adversary corrupts all but one of the channels, which is impossible in the standard cryptographic setting. In this work, we study a game-theoretic setting in which all the channels are corrupted by two or more independent adversaries. Specifically, we assume that there are several adversaries who exclusively corrupt subsets of the channels, and prefer to violate the security of SMT with being undetected. Additionally, we assume that each adversary prefers other adversaries’ tampering to be detected. We show that secure SMT protocols can be constructed even if all the channels are corrupted by such rational adversaries. We also study the situation in which both malicious and rational adversaries exist.
AB - Secure Message Transmission (SMT) is a two-party protocol by which the sender can privately transmit a message to the receiver through multiple channels. An adversary can corrupt a subset of channels and makes eavesdropping and tampering over the corrupted channels. Fujita et al. (GameSec 2018) introduced a game-theoretic security notion of SMT, and showed protocols that are secure even if an adversary corrupts all but one of the channels, which is impossible in the standard cryptographic setting. In this work, we study a game-theoretic setting in which all the channels are corrupted by two or more independent adversaries. Specifically, we assume that there are several adversaries who exclusively corrupt subsets of the channels, and prefer to violate the security of SMT with being undetected. Additionally, we assume that each adversary prefers other adversaries’ tampering to be detected. We show that secure SMT protocols can be constructed even if all the channels are corrupted by such rational adversaries. We also study the situation in which both malicious and rational adversaries exist.
KW - Cryptography
KW - Game theory
KW - Rational adversary
KW - Secure message transmission
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85076422448&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85076422448&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_33
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_33
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85076422448
SN - 9783030324292
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 563
EP - 582
BT - Decision and Game Theory for Security - 10th International Conference, GameSec 2019, Proceedings
A2 - Alpcan, Tansu
A2 - Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy
A2 - Baras, John S.
A2 - Dán, György
PB - Springer
T2 - 10th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2019
Y2 - 30 October 2019 through 1 November 2019
ER -