Pricing and operation in deregulated electricity market by noncooperative game

L. Geerli*, L. Chen, R. Yokoyama

*この研究の対応する著者

    研究成果: Article査読

    15 被引用数 (Scopus)

    抄録

    Pricing structure is becoming considerably important for both electric utility industries and their customers. This paper derives an operation rule for a market model with an electric utility and independent power producers (IPPs) as players of the noncooperative game. The derived operation rules reflecting the competition can be viewed as an extension of the conventional equalizing incremental cost method for the deregulated power systems. As indicated in this paper, the prices of electricity for purchases and sales are equal to the incremental costs of the generators of IPPs but are generally cheaper than the incremental cost of the generators belonging to the utility. To examine the proposed approach, several systems are used as the demonstrated examples in this paper.

    本文言語English
    ページ(範囲)133-139
    ページ数7
    ジャーナルElectric Power Systems Research
    57
    2
    DOI
    出版ステータスPublished - 2001 3月 5

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • エネルギー工学および電力技術
    • 電子工学および電気工学

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