TY - JOUR
T1 - Privacy-Aware Sensing-Quality-Based Budget Feasible Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Fingerprint Collection
AU - Li, Wei
AU - Zhang, Cheng
AU - Tanaka, Yoshiaki
N1 - Funding Information:
The work of Wei Li was supported by the China Scholarship Council (CSC) under Grant 201706690030.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2013 IEEE.
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - Mobile crowdsourcing (MCS) has shown great potential in received signal strength (RSS) fingerprint collection, in which an incentive mechanism plays a critical role to motivate users' participation. However, how to quantify the quality of the gathered fingerprint data is still not addressed well in the design of incentive mechanism for MCS-based fingerprint collection. In this paper, a sensing quality metric is proposed to characterize the joint impact of users' privacy protection and the spatial coverage of the submitted data. Given a limited budget, a basic incentive mechanism is devised to recruit appropriate users to maximize sensing quality. Considering that the cost of each user is regarded as private information and users may be attempted to misreport their costs to increase the revenue. Hence, an auction-based incentive mechanism is proposed to achieve the truthfulness of users' costs, which is truthful, individually rational, computationally efficient and budget feasible. Simulation results show that our proposed schemes outperform the baseline schemes and the experiment with real-world data is carried out to evaluate the performance of our proposed basic incentive mechanism.
AB - Mobile crowdsourcing (MCS) has shown great potential in received signal strength (RSS) fingerprint collection, in which an incentive mechanism plays a critical role to motivate users' participation. However, how to quantify the quality of the gathered fingerprint data is still not addressed well in the design of incentive mechanism for MCS-based fingerprint collection. In this paper, a sensing quality metric is proposed to characterize the joint impact of users' privacy protection and the spatial coverage of the submitted data. Given a limited budget, a basic incentive mechanism is devised to recruit appropriate users to maximize sensing quality. Considering that the cost of each user is regarded as private information and users may be attempted to misreport their costs to increase the revenue. Hence, an auction-based incentive mechanism is proposed to achieve the truthfulness of users' costs, which is truthful, individually rational, computationally efficient and budget feasible. Simulation results show that our proposed schemes outperform the baseline schemes and the experiment with real-world data is carried out to evaluate the performance of our proposed basic incentive mechanism.
KW - Local differential privacy
KW - auction theory
KW - crowdsourced fingerprint collection
KW - incentive mechanism
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U2 - 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2974909
DO - 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2974909
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85082305436
SN - 2169-3536
VL - 8
SP - 49775
EP - 49784
JO - IEEE Access
JF - IEEE Access
M1 - 9001141
ER -