抄録
By focusing on players’ relative contributions, we study some properties for values in positive cooperative games with transferable utilities. The well-known properties of symmetry (also known as “equal treatment of equals”) and marginality are based on players’ marginal contributions to coalitions. Both Myerson’s balanced contributions property and its generalization of the balanced cycle contributions property (Kamijo and Kongo Int J of Game Theory 39:563–571, 2010; BCC) are based on players’ marginal contributions to other players. We define relative versions of marginality and BCC by replacing marginal contributions with relative contributions, and examine efficient values satisfying each of the two properties. On the class of positive games, a relative variation of marginality is incompatible with efficiency, and together with efficiency and the invariance property with respect to the payoffs of players under a player deletion, a relative variation of BCC characterizes the proportional value and egalitarian value in a unified manner.
| 本文言語 | English |
|---|---|
| ページ（範囲） | 77-87 |
| ページ数 | 11 |
| ジャーナル | Theory and Decision |
| 巻 | 78 |
| 号 | 1 |
| DOI | |
| 出版ステータス | Published - 2013 1月 |
| 外部発表 | はい |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- 決定科学（全般）
- 発達心理学および教育心理学
- 人文科学（その他）
- 応用心理学
- 社会科学（全般）
- 経済学、計量経済学および金融学（全般）
- コンピュータ サイエンスの応用