Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities

André Casajus, Yukihiko Funaki, Frank Huettner*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

The Shapley value equals a player's contribution to the potential of a game. The potential is a most natural one-number summary of a game, which can be computed as the expected accumulated worth of a random partition of the players. This computation integrates the coalition formation of all players and readily extends to games with externalities. We investigate those potential functions for games with externalities that can be computed this way. It turns out that the potential that corresponds to the MPW solution introduced by Macho-Stadler et al. (2007, J. Econ. Theory 135, 339–356) is unique in the following sense. It is obtained as the expected accumulated worth of a random partition, it generalizes the potential for games without externalities, and it induces a solution that satisfies the null player property even in the presence of externalities.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)88-106
ページ数19
ジャーナルGames and Economic Behavior
147
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2024 9月

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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