@article{7e4d5d3f9dcc4eadbd7e5bd9aa117796,
title = "Stable coalition structures under restricted coalitional changes",
abstract = "In this paper, we examine whether farsighted players form the efficient grand coalition structure in coalition formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, called sequentially stability, when only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of high negotiation costs. We provide an algorithm to check the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure as well as sufficient conditions for which the efficient grand coalition structure is sequentially stable. We also illustrate out results by means of common pool resource games and Cournot oligopoly games.",
keywords = "Coalition formation, Cournot oligopoly, common pool resource, farsighted players, stability",
author = "Yukihiko Funaki and Takehiko Yamato",
note = "Funding Information: We thank two anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions. We are also grateful for helpful comments provided by participants at the first SING (2005) conference, seminars at Tilburg University, VU University Amsterdam, Maastricht University, Montpellier University and Tinbergen Institute, especially, Reinoud Joosten, Yuan Ju, and Yoshio Kamijo. Funaki thanks CentER of Tilburg University and Department of Econometrics and OR of VU University Amsterdam, and Yamato thanks the Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences at the California Institute of Technology for their hospitality during the period when this draft was written. Research was partially supported by the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in Japan.",
year = "2014",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1142/S0219198914500066",
language = "English",
volume = "16",
journal = "International Game Theory Review",
issn = "0219-1989",
publisher = "World Scientific",
number = "3",
}