@article{71a63d5a2cae472f8141d5f9738d3a8f,
title = "Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting",
abstract = "Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters{\textquoteright} most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72.",
keywords = "Campaign platform, Elections, Polarization, Political ambiguity, Probabilistic voting, Public promise",
author = "Yasushi Asako",
note = "Funding Information: The author has benefitted from the comments of Amihai Glazer, Airo Hino, Hideki Konishi, Michael Munger, Tetsuro Okazaki, and Orestis Troumpounis. The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Financial support from JSPS KAKENHI (Grant Number 26780178 and 17K13755) is gratefully acknowledged. Funding Information: The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Financial support from JSPS KAKENHI (Grant Number 26780178 and 17K13755) is gratefully acknowledged. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} The Author(s) 2019.",
year = "2019",
month = oct,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1177/0951629819875516",
language = "English",
volume = "31",
pages = "626--641",
journal = "Journal of Theoretical Politics",
issn = "0951-6298",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Ltd",
number = "4",
}