TY - JOUR
T1 - Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas
T2 - Comparison of centralized punishment institutions
AU - Kamijo, Y.
AU - Nihonsugi, T.
AU - Takeuchi, A.
AU - Funaki, Y.
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank Charles Noussair, Robert Vestzeg, Jana Vyrastekova, and participants at the 2011 Japanese Economic Association Spring Meeting and PET11 for their helpful comments. Ai Takeuchi was supported by JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) 23730195 .
PY - 2014/3
Y1 - 2014/3
N2 - This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater than that of the former institution with the same requirement and sanction level. The results of an experiment support this theoretical prediction. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and laboratory observations in that the institution with the theoretically optimal requirement did not yield the highest profit.
AB - This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater than that of the former institution with the same requirement and sanction level. The results of an experiment support this theoretical prediction. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and laboratory observations in that the institution with the theoretically optimal requirement did not yield the highest profit.
KW - Laboratory experiment
KW - Linear public goods game
KW - Punishment institutions
KW - Sanction
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U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.002
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.002
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84893861626
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 84
SP - 180
EP - 195
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
ER -