TY - JOUR
T1 - The balanced contributions property for symmetric players
AU - Yokote, Koji
AU - Kongo, Takumi
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 15K17031 (Kongo).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2017/5/1
Y1 - 2017/5/1
N2 - This paper introduces a new relational axiom, the balanced contributions property for symmetric players, in TU cooperative games. It describes the fair treatment of symmetric players by restricting the requirement of the balanced contributions property to two symmetric players. Even under efficiency, our new axiom is logically independent of symmetry, which requires that symmetric players receive the same payoff. Nonetheless, in previous axiomatizations of an anonymous solution, replacing symmetry with our new axiom results in new axiomatizations of the solution.
AB - This paper introduces a new relational axiom, the balanced contributions property for symmetric players, in TU cooperative games. It describes the fair treatment of symmetric players by restricting the requirement of the balanced contributions property to two symmetric players. Even under efficiency, our new axiom is logically independent of symmetry, which requires that symmetric players receive the same payoff. Nonetheless, in previous axiomatizations of an anonymous solution, replacing symmetry with our new axiom results in new axiomatizations of the solution.
KW - Axiomatization
KW - Balanced contribution
KW - Game theory
KW - Symmetry
KW - TU cooperative game
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U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2017.03.005
DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2017.03.005
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85016233613
SN - 0167-6377
VL - 45
SP - 227
EP - 231
JO - Operations Research Letters
JF - Operations Research Letters
IS - 3
ER -